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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MERCHANT MARINE 
TO 
NATIONAL POWER 
A lecture delivered by 
Commander George D. Synon, U. S. C. G. 
at the Naval War College 
September 12, 1949 
In considering the relation of the Merchant Marine to na­
tional power, it is perhaps automatic for members of the Armed 
Forces to regard a large fleet of commercial shipping as indis­
pensible to the security of the United States. This premise has 
been fundamental to American naval strategy ever since Mahan 
enunciated his concept of sea power toward the end of the last 
century. It is today a proposition that is widely supported by 
many outstanding figures who write and speak publicly on this 
subject. 
Here, at the War College, however, we must not fall into 
the error of accepting any dogma or doctrine simply because it 
has been demonstrated in the past to be sound or well-conceived. 
It is necessary, rather, constantly to re-appraise in the light of 
changing world conditions any and all of the strategic premises upon 
which our thinking may tend to become fixed. 
Especially is this so in the case of the Merchant Marine. 
In the United States, private industry has been unable to operate 
ocean shipping on any wide scale without financial assistance from 
the Government. We call this subsidy; and we justify the payment 
of subsidy on the ground that the Merchant Marine is essential to 
economic prosperity and for the national defense. Consequently, 
the support of a large fleet of commercial shipping has come to be 
Commander Synon is a member of the Naval War College Staff. 
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accepted in the United States as a proper function of government. 
This viewpoint is vigorously and sincerely supported by the great 
majority of individuals and organizations connected with the mari­
time industry. But there are many people who believe that an ex­
panded Merchant Marine may be contrary to the best interests of 
the United States at the present time. These · persons are, of 
course, in the minority, but their arguments deserve careful scrut­
iny at an institution such as the War College. One ·of the pur­
poses of this discussion is to present that contrary point of 
view. Many of you officers here may at some time in the future 
be called upon to make decisions touching on the Merchant Marine. 
You will be helped in arriving at these decisions by a knowledge 
not only of the many good arguments both for and against a
strong U. S. Merchant Marine, but also by those which may be 
frankly designed to influence public opinion. 
As an example of what I am talking about, let me recall to 
your mind the state of the American Merchant Marine prior to 
World War I and II. At the beginning of the first World War, 
we had very little ocean shipping. Other nations carried the major 
part of our foreign commerce. When we finally got into that War, 
we simply did not have the ships we needed. Our troops and the 
vast bulk of our munitions had to be transported overseas in the 
ships of our allies. In World War II, we were in somewhat better 
shape-particularly as to shipbuilding-but from the standpoint of 
available tonnage, we were as poorly prepared to wage global war 
in 1941 as we were in 1917. 
The backers of a strong Merchant Marine policy point to 
these two instances of unpreparedness as over-riding reason for us 
to support an expanded fleet of merchant shipping in the future. 
And yet, a pretty good case can be made out for the prop­
osition that if the United States had been supporting such a mer­
chant fleet, the Allies would probably have lost World War I and 
2 
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/1
RESTRICTED 
could not have won World War IL I shall attempt to do so a little 
later in this discussion. 
In the meantime, however, let us take a brief glance at 
national power in its broadest sense, and determine, if we can, how 
merchant shipping, as a part of sea power, has contributed to the 
national greatness and prosperity of maritime states in the past. 
Against such a background, I shall attempt to relate merchant 
shipping to certain aspects of military strategy as it has historically 
been employed in the case of Great Britain, since that nation dis­
plays so many features that are strategically similar to our own. 
Then, turning. to the present, we may consider a number of factors 
brought about as a result of World War II which, in my opinion, 
require a revision in our traditional concept-to some degree of sea 
power-but more precisely, of the function of the Merchant Marine. 
These factors are intimately related to the economics of world trade, 
without some knowledge of which it is difficult to understand the 
shipping situation as it exists today. And finally, a few conclusions, 
which may be justified by prevailing world conditions and our 
strategic needs for the future. 
Character of National Power
The nations of the world have been broadly classified as con­
tinental and maritime powers. Many military historians agree 
that the character of a nation from this standpoint dictates the 
form of strategy that is best suited to it. The British, for ex­
ample, are a maritime people, and they have, with success, pursued 
a maritime strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, are a con­
tinental power, and their important military successes have been 
on land. Mind you, this is not to say that a single nation may 
not combine in itself certain elements of both sea and land power. 
It is simply that such influences as geography, natural resources, 
population, and so forth, serve to direct the interests of a people 
3 
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primarily toward the land, or toward the sea. If these forces are 
recognized and understood, it is possible, in my opinion, to measure 
the dependence of a state upon overseas trade, and thus to de­
termine a maritime strategy best suited to preserve or increase 
the national power. 
If we examine the nations of Europe and Asia and arrange 
them according to their historical pattern as continental or mari­
time powers, we will observe one significant difference between the 
two groups. All of the maritime powers-save Great Britain­
seem at some time in their history to have risen to world leader­
ship as sea powers, and then to have passed into decline-never to 
recover sea power once it has been lost. Whether Great Britain is 
now moving toward the fringes of that pattern, it is as yet too 
soon to say. But not so the continental powers. The great land 
powers-Russia, France, Germany-have lost and have regained 
the dominant position in Europe on numerous occasions. Even 
during periods of decline, they possess their political significance 
-as an example, we have the case of Spain today-as opposed to
the almost complete loss of influence in world affairs suffered by
the small nations that border on the sea-of whom Portugal is
likewise a case in point.
The reason for this political phenomenon is, I believe, that 
continental powers retain the essential attributes of territory, ma­
terial resources, manpower-which cannot be taken from them­
whereas, a truly maritime power can compensate itself for the 
lack of these advantages only by remaining strong at sea, and sea 
power-for reasons that are not clear-does not renew itself. 
It seems fair to say, then, that if the independent nations of 
the world who are truly maritime in character are forced away 
from the sea-whether by economic competition they cannot meet, 
4 
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or by political or military means, their influence in world affairs 
and, correspondingly, their capacity to defend their independence, 
will be markedly reduced. This is the situation confronting the 
smaller maritime powers today. 
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Power 
Now, what is the connection between merchant shipping and 
the rise and fall of maritime states? 
The Mediterranean basin is perhaps the most fruitful area 
for an investigation of this sort. It is the scene of the emergence 
of a succession of maritime powers throughout the span of re­
corded history. Morever, the course of warfare in Europe has 
been inseparably identified with sea power in the Mediterranean. 
Naval strength has been exerted in these narrow waters almost 
invariably in either of two forms: in the protection of maritime 
commerce or in the employment of naval and merchant ship types 
for the support of land armies. It is significant that the changes 
in weapons and methods of warfare that have taken place since 
many centuries before the birth of Christ have failed to alter the 
fundamental strategic factors that determine military success or 
failure in this critical area of the world. The advantages of in­
terior lines, mobility, and freedom of action that were enjoyed by 
the ancient powers who were able to control and use the sea lanes 
of the Mediterranean persist until this day. 
In 525 B. C., Cambyses, the King of Persia, invaded and 
subdued Egypt. Then he looked westward, toward Carthage, and 
sent his army overland-across the Libyan Desert-to conquer 
Carthage and add that nation to his empire. But the Phoenicians 
-blood brothers to the Carthaginians-who controlled the sea,
and whom Cambyses could neither coerce nor intimidate, refused
to help him with their ships. Without a fleet for the support of
5 
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his troops, Cambyses could not surmount his supply problem across 
North Africa-and his army perished in the desert. Yet, in 1940, 
the British, under General Wavell, in one of the most remarkable 
military campaigns on record, moved across this same stretch of 
North African coast to destroy an Italian army of more than 200,-
000 men. But the British right flank rested firmly on the free use 
qf sea communications for the support of Wavell's tank columns 
and tactical air. 
Indeed, control of the Mediterranean littoral has traditionally 
been achieved and maintained by those· belligerents who have first 
made secure their communications by sea. Alexander the Great 
recognized as· hopeless any attempt to conquer Egypt until he had 
first disposed of the Phoenician navy which lay astride the supply 
routes of his land armies. So, as a first step, Alexander, unlike 
Cambyses, besieged Tyre, the principal Phoenician city, and re­
duced it after a campaign of seven months. But by this operation, 
Alexander removed the threat to his rear, and he obtained the cargo 
shipping without which he could not move against Egypt. Na­
poleon, on the other hand, did not percieve that sea power in the 
eastern Mediterranean was indispensable to the success of his armies 
on land. In his campaign to gain an eastern empire, Napoleon was 
turned back at Acre by an inferior Turkish force supported from 
seaward by a small squadron of British ships under Sir Sidney 
Smith. During the preceding year, as you will recall, Nelson had 
demolished the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile, and Napoleon 
was without the means to sustain his communications in the face 
of British command of the sea. This engagement marked the 
collapse of his dream of an empire in the East. After his defeat 
before Acre, Napoleon retired on his base in Egypt-baffled by 
his inability to use the sea. 
The principal states that have held maritime power in the 
Mediterranean are Phoenicia, Carthage, the Greek States, Rome, 
6 
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Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. These States all have certain character­
istics in common. Taken as a whole, they may probably be said to 
comprise the identity of true maritime character. And it is well 
to bear in mind that we are examining a period of more than 2,500 
years. These States were invariably small in geographic extent. 
They lacked natural resources and arable land. They bordered 
on difficult terrain-mountains and deserts, or else the territory of 
unfriendly people!:!. The inhabitants of the maritime States were 
traders and craftsmen, rather than farmers or herdsmen. And 
these States depended on the importation by sea of foodstuffs and 
raw materials they were unable to produce at home. Like all other 
true maritime powers, they derived a large part of their national 
income from hauling the waterborne commerce of other nations 
not inclined toward the sea. But their greatest source of wealth and 
power grew out of their colonies, which they all sought to obtain 
and exploit. 
The earlier maritime powers of the Atlantic share these same 
characteristics-Portugal and Holland, for example. Great Brit­
ain falls into a somewhat special category, but only because of 
her insularity, which underlines both her dependence on the sea 
and the natural protection that it affords her. I would exclude 
France and Spain from such a grouping, despite their extensive 
maritime history, since they are primarily continental in charac­
ter. But it is proper to add to the list of early maritime states 
our own New England seaboard, as it existed from the beginning 
of the Nineteenth Century until the Civil War, as this region ex­
hibited so many of the features of maritime character. 
As you well know, pre-eminence at sea has been distin­
guished by the ownership of both combat and commercial fleets, 
but it is well to hold in mind that combat fleets have been sub­
ordinate in the order of national power to the commercial fleets 
7 
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they are designed to complement and to protect. The historian Gib­
bon clearly sums up this relationship in writing of Venice at the 
time of the Crusades: "Nor did she often forget that if armed gal­
leys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause 
and supply of her greatness." 
The decline of sea powers cannot always be ascribed to any 
immediate cause. In the history of nations that have risen to mari­
time greatness and have lost it, there are deep and slowly moving 
influences which I do not intend to examine here. But in the final 
stages of the decay of sea power, there is one clear sign for all to 
see: The merchant shipping of a declining sea power disappears 
from the seas by reason of enemy action or withers it at home 
through loss of profitable trade. 
The Military Strategy of Great Britain 
Let us now turn to Great Britain as the classic example of 
national greatness resulting from sea power. An understanding 
of the means Britain has employed to obtain and hold world power 
will assist us in applying correctly our own maritime strength in 
support of the national policy. It is not necessary to point out to 
this audience the similarities between our maritime position and 
that of Great Britain. It is, rather, the dissimilarities that must 
be emphasized. Among these, the most important is our lack of de­
pendence on the outside world for food. Of almost equal importance 
is the self-contained nature of our economy. This is not to infer 
that we do not draw from other parts of the world raw materials 
we do not produce in adequate quantities at home, or that the 
revenue we obtain from foreign trade does not form an important 
part of our national income. It is simply that our economy is not 
geared to a complex machinery of imports, exports, and all their 
related maritime enterprises-as is Great Britain's. It has truly 
been said that England must export or die. That statement could 
8 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/1
RESTRICTED 
not apply to us whatever. And a final difference to be stressed is 
that the United States-in addition to being a great sea power­
is also a great land power, despite Mahan's thesis that no nation 
could be both. 
Britain has applied sea power with a skill that surpasses 
all the other features of her foreign policy. King George V called 
England's Fleet her "sure shield", as indeed it has been. Not since 
William the Conqueror has Britain been invaded in war, although 
there have been periods when invasion seemed imminent. And, 
strange to say, there have always been Britons who feared invasion 
at times such as these and have urged the erection of all sorts of 
complicated land defenses to meet the enemy when he first stepped 
on shore. When Napoleon stood on the Boulogne coast, with an 
army of 130,000 men and a great assembly of transport and cargo 
craft to ferry it. across the Channel, the Admiralty itself was ap­
prehensive the invasion would succeed. But Lord St. Vincent­
under whom the immortal Nelson learned his trade-knowing full 
well the French would first have to dispose of the English Fleet 
that lay in the Channel, reassured the Admiralty in a classic re­
mark that seems worth repeating. "I do not say the French can­
not come", he said, "I only say they cannot come by sea." 
The strategy by which Britain has employed naval strength 
to advance and protect the interests of her commercial fleets is 
well known. Less widely recognized, perhaps, is somewhat the re­
verse of this circumstance: whereby merchant shipping has been 
a primary influence in shaping Britain's military strategy. In every 
war, as you know, the readiness of a weapon for use exerts a con­
trolling influence on the way the war is fought. In this sense, 
merchant shipping has served Britain as a weapon. 
The British have gained their most notable military suc­
cesses when they have been able to employ land armies of relat-
9 
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ively small size at critical points where control of the sea ap­
proaches could be assured. By this strategy, Britain has been able 
to minimize her lack of manpower and bring to bear against con­
tinental opponents inconvenient or distracting pressure on flank or 
rear, Such a strategy depends, of course, upon allies to engage the 
enemy frontally if the war is to be fought to a conclusion. But it 
has been the· pref erred policy of Britain not to engage in land war­
fare against a continental opponent unless assisted by a continental 
ally. Merchant ships have provided the means by which this ec­
centric form of strategy might be put to use. (And by eccentric, I 
mean displaced from the center, rather than queer or odd.) Relat­
ively small forces have been landed by transport and cargo shipping 
at points remote from the main theater but which the enemy is com­
pelled to def end if he is to remain secure all along his line. 
This eccentric form of warfare is ideally exemplified by 
Wellington's campaign in the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the na­
tions of Europe were allied with England against Napoleon, and 
the main theater of war was in mid-continent. Wellington used 
the Fleet to transport his army to Portugal, where he entered 
Europe, in the French rear. His army was relatively small but it 
imposed an annoying division of force upon the French. Wellington 
could not be ignored since he was stirring up so much trouble 
with the Spaniards. The attempt to dislodge him in a series of 
limited engagements was unsuccessful; and to have moved against 
him in force-which Napoleon would have been compelled to do­
meant transferring the main theater of war. In such a case, 
Wellington would either have retired behind his prepared posi­
tions at Torres Vedras or re-embarked his army into his trans­
ports. Thus Napoleon was confronted with what all continental 
soldiers seek to avoid: a war on two fronts. When Wellington felt 
that he was strong enough to move toward France, he used the 
Fleet to transfer his base by easy stages along the Spanish coast-
10 
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line. "If anyone", Wellington said, "wishes to know the history of 
this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me 
the power of maintaining my army, while the enemy are unable to 
do so." 
And yet, despite the maritime strategy that has been so well 
suited to British arms, there is a perverse streak in British military 
character which seeks the land battle of large proportions. Before 
the outbreak of the first World War, there was a clear schism in 
British military planning. The Admiralty group was all for em­
ploying the small British Expeditionary Force in the event of war 
in an eccentric move-an amphibious landing along the Pomer­
anian coast, in the German rear, or along the Belgian coast, at 
Ostend or Zebrtigge, on the flank. By this means, it was con­
tended, far more pressure would be taken off the French than if the 
British divisions were to take up a position on the left of the main 
French line. The opposing group in the War Office favored the em­
ployment of Britain's military effort in direct action against the 
principal German armies. Sir Henry Wilson, then Director of 
Military Operations, and an ardent Francophile, put over his plan 
to get the British army of six divisions into alignment with the 
French as soon after the outbreak of war as possible. 
Now, if the British have a defect in their military make­
up, it is their dogged persistence-once they are committed to a 
line of action-in following it out to the bitter end. "Maintaining 
the objective", they call it. The French recognize this. On one oc­
casion, Wilson inquired of General Foch what would be the smallest 
number of British troops that would be of any value to France in 
the event of a war with Germany. "Send us one British soldier", 
Foch replied, "and we shall take pains to see that he is killed !" 
The result was, that instead of the modest army of six di­
visions with which Britain had thought to assist France, she mobil-
11 
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ized three and a half million men, of whom 700,000 were killed-a 
disaster from which she has never recovered. 
The Dardanelles campaign was the only operation of major 
proportions undertaken by the Allies during World War I in which 
this eccentric strategy was employed. Its objective was to turn the 
left flank �f the Central Powers by knocking Turkey out of the war, 
and thus to obtain access to eastern Europe as a means for sustain­
ing Russia. Notwithstanding its failure and the criticism which 
has attended it, the Dardanelles campaign was soundly conceived. 
It was a proper and logical use of the mobility afforded by trans­
port type shipping to apply land pressure at a critical point the 
enemy could not readily def end. This operation failed not so much 
because of the brilliant defense put up by the German, Liman von 
Sanders, but primarily because the British were unable to support 
two offensives at the same time. Reinforcements that might have 
turned the tide at Gallipoli were withheld until after the Loos of­
fensive on the Western Front. 
Can we perceive in all this a lesson for the United States? 
Militarily, we possess the insular advantages of Great Britain but 
we possess also her corresponding disadvantage of limited man­
power in comparison with that of. our most likely continental ad­
versary. It is, of course, no part of my purpose to suggest for us 
any basic plan for war, but it seems plain, if Britain is to be 
taken as any sort of an example, that we cannot afford the head­
long employment of great masses of troops in land warfare against 
a continental opponent. If this be so, and I think it is, then we 
must-in the conservation of our national power-turn to an ec­
centric-a maritime form of strategy-and exploit the advantages 
of mobility, surprise, and economy of force that are conferred by 
sea power-at the heart of which is merchant type shipping. 
12 
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Political and Economic Considerations 
It was primary thesis of Admiral Mahan that for a nation 
to be a great sea power it must conform to three requirements: 
First, such a nation must have the means of production, and thus 
be stimulated to the exchange of products. Second, it must have 
shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on. And, third, it must 
own colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping. 
(Incidentally, our own lack of colonies led Mahan to question 
whether the United States could ever become truly great at sea.) 
Prior to World War II, this concept of sea power was well 
supported in the history of maritime nations. You will observe, 
however, that it is a concept that grows out of the colonial sys­
tem and the doctrine of mercantilism. In the period before World 
War I-in which Mahan wrote-the maritime powers were in con­
stant struggle for individual advancement, and all of them owned 
colonies. Under the system of mercantilism, a nation seeks to ob­
tain the materials needed to support its economy from within its 
own orbit and to export its production to others at a profit. Hence, 
each of the maritime states required its own fleet of merchant 
shipping, since none could depend upon its rivals to provide ships 
at a time when not to provide them would weaken the relative 
position of the other. 
Taken on the whole, this theory of sea power was certainly 
justified by world conditions prevailing until World War II. But, as 
a result of that War, there have been profound changes in the mili­
tary and economic workings of world politics which, in my opinion, 
cause us to revise our earlier ideas of what is, and what is not, in the 
national interest. The rise of international gangsterism and the to­
talitarian state has forced peace-loving nations to look toward col­
lective action as the best means of preserving their individual se­
curity. In World War II, we used lend-lease to support nations 
13 
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whose interests were tied up with our own. At the present time, we 
are endeavoring by means of E. C. A. to restore and sustain the 
economic structure of the free nations of Europe. We believe 
those nations must enjoy a reasonable degree of prosperity if they 
are to be strong enough to withstand penetration by forces or ideol­
ogies dangerous to ourselves. In order to do this, we are expending 
-and we are committed to expend-a vast portion of our national
substance. Nobody knows what this program ultimately may cost.
But it is a program, nonetheless, around which our entire foreign
policy is centered.
This is a philosophy of world politics to which we as a na­
tion have not heretofore subscribed. And it imposes upon us the 
necessity to review some of the assumptions wh.ich have been funda­
mental to our national thinking in the past. One of these is the as'." 
sumption that the ownership of a large merchant marine is a 
source of national power. Standing alone, this assumption is good,; 
but it fails to take into account other, more potent, factors upon 
which the national interest depends. As I see it, the question to be 
decided is whether national support of an expanded U. S. merchant 
fleet is in agreement with our larger policy of aid to Europe. If 
not, then we must find a policy for the Merchant Marine that tends 
to advance the program we are embarked upon in Europe at such 
great cost arid risk to ourselves. 
Since our immediate objectives in Europe are economic, let us 
give some attention to the economics of world shipping. 
It so happens that most of the nations to whom we are ex'." 
tending assistance are maritime powers-Norway, Britain, The 
Netherlands, and Greece, for example. Or else they have large 
maritime interests, such as France and Italy. The life of these na.: 
tions to great extent depends on the sea. Before World War II, they 
14 
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shared-if we exclud� Japan---,-the.bulk of the carrying trade of the 
world. The. transportation of ocean commerce is one of the prin­
cipal services they sell to others. These countries haul freight 
cheaply and efficiently. Moreover, they must have the income they 
derive from this service if they are to maintain economic stability. 
It affords their peoples a means of livelihood and provides them with 
foreign exchange to buy the food and materials they cannot produce 
at home. Today, the shipyards of Europe are striving to replace the 
tonnage lost during the War, although the United States can sup­
ply enough shipping for all the world's needs. These nations realize 
intuitively they cannot turn their backs on the sea. 
With this background, we may return to the proposition ad­
vanced earlier in this discussion, namely, that the existence of a 
large U.S. Merchant Marine would have jeopardized Allied chances 
of winning World Wars I and II. 
First, let us recognize that the total demands of world trade 
will support a corresponding amount of world shipping. In other 
words, the more trade, the more shipping in active employment. 
But existing tonnage in excess of these requirements will either be 
operated at a loss, or it will remain idle, since there will not be 
enough trade to go round. Thus, at any given time, there is a pool 
of world shipping that provides the means of ocean transportation 
for world commerce. If the principles of economics are allowed to 
operate freely, the size of this pool will be determined by the law 
of supply and demand. Some nations will hold more of this shipping, 
and others will hold less, depending upon their ability to compete in 
the various world trades. 
This was essentially the system that prevaiied prior to World 
War I and II. Foreigners could operate ocean shipping more cheap­




Naval War College: November 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
Now, what happens when you tinker with this system? 
What would have been the effect if, a few years prior to World War 
I or II, we had, by means of subsidy, put an expanded U. S. mer­
chant fleet into the pool of world shipping? The result, as you can 
very well see, would have been to force certain of the other carrier 
nations to cut down their merchant fleets to the level the remaining 
trade would accommodate. 
It is not hard to see which nations these would have been. 
They would have been those nations whose costs of operation most 
nearly approached our own-which means Britain, since she has less 
of a margin, or cushion, to absorb the pressure of uneconomic com­
petition from us. It is, of course, quite true that Britain's world­
wide interests would have preserved for her a substantial merchant 
fleet-still the largest in the world-but, nevertheless, competition 
of the magnitude we are considering here would seriously have cut 
into the tonnage that was available to Britain at the outbreak of both 
World Wars. 
There is good reason to believe the German U-Boat cam­
paigns against British shipping in both World War I and II very 
nearly succeeded. If the results of the first U-Boat campaign in 
World War I be examined-and there were two separate campaigns 
in that War-it will be observed that the British barely managed 
to survive. With a smaller merchant fleet, there seems no doubt 
Britain would have been starved into submission. The United 
States was doing its best to remain neutral-not sending its ships 
into the war zone, and so forth-but we had ocean freight backed 
up on every railroad siding as far west as Chicago. The pressure 
was on to do something for the Allies, and to get that freight mov­
ing. 
A larger U. S. Merchant Marine would have alleviated this 
situation, and we would have been able to send our industrial and 
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agricultural production throughout the rest of the world. Likewise, 
a larger U.S. merchant tonnage would have increased the potential 
hazard to Germany if the United States were drawn into the War; 
and, with the correspondingly better prospects of success of its 
U-Boat campaign against Britain, it seems quite likely the German
High Command would not have initiated the policy of indiscriminate
sinking that finally did bring us into the War.
The situation was very much the same in World War II. 
Although Britain had a greater tonnage, she had military commit­
ments that required merchant shipping on a far wider scale. Cargo 
bottoms were a critical shortage for Britain throughout the War. Ac­
cording to the British White Paper of November, 1944, Britain 
started World War II with 17,500,000 gross tons of merchant ship­
ping under her control. By the end of 1943, she had lost the as­
tounding total of nearly twelve million gross 
,
tons! 
It is not necessary for us to dwell on the probable results of 
the elimination of Great Britain as an opponent to Germany in either 
World War I or II. And I am well aware that the circumstances 
which I have outlined and which might have forced her withdrawal 
are entirely conjectural. But my point is this-we must not accept 
blindly the statement that a large Merchant Marine is for the 
United States an unfailing source of national power. 
We share with Britain leadership in a world complex of sea 
power that rings the continents of Europe and Asia like a girdle. 
The members of that complex are mutually supporting. This align­
ment of maritime strength provides individual states in the mari­
time community with what is probably their most valuable single 
means to withstand domination by land power. A proper policy for 
the Merchant Marine will tend to preserve this alignment upon 
which the maritime position of the United States ultimately depends. 
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How can we go about doing this? 
First, I should say we must estimate, as best we can, what 
will be our requirements for merchant type shipping in the event of 
war-not only for ourselves, but also for our prospective allies. 
Then we must determine how these requirements may be satis­
fied without adversely affecting our other vital interests not direct­
ly related to shipping. 
Allied needs for merchant shipping in time of war arrange 
themselves naturally into two categories: the short-term needs 
and the long-term needs. The pool of world shipping is one of the 
principal sources from which this tonnage may be obtained-just 
as it was in the last War and the War before that. Merchant ships 
lose much of their nationality in time of war. Officers here can re­
call convoys in the last War in which the flags of half a dozen 
Allied nations were flown. In World War II, the merchant tonnage 
available to all the Allies was drawn upon as a common fund­
centrally disposed of and centrally directed. We may expect some 
such procedure to be adopted in any future war. 
If we define our short-term needs as those during the first 
six months of a war, it will be safe to say they can be adequately 
provided for from three already existing sources: (1) the tonnage 
controlled by our prospective allies and friendly neutrals, (2) the re­
serve fleets, which we must keep up-to-date and in good order, and 
(3) the active U. S. Merchant Marine.
I will not touch further on the first two of these sources. 
Nor will I discuss the merchant type tonnage available in the Mili­
tary Sea Transport Service. But, as to the third of these sources of 
short-term shipping, it is my opinion that we can maintain under 
our Flag a fleet of merchant shipping which will take its proper place 
in the world complex of maritime power-without weakening any 
18 
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/1
RESTRICTED 
of its members-and still give us a good nucleus for expansion in 
time of war. 
Briefly stated, such a fleet may be built around three pri­
mary peacetime demands for shipping in the United States : 
(1) Domestic shipping. Coastal and intercoastal shipping is flat on
its back. It has never returned to the level of activity it en­
joyed prior to World Wars I and II. It must be restored if our
maritime potential is to be maintained. I would urge the extension
of subsidy or some other form of government assistance to this
type of shipping if for no other reason than it is an invaluable
source of seamen and of the miscellaneous smaller auxiliary craft
always so badly needed upon the outbreak of war. (2) The tonnage
we must operate on certain ocean routes to guarantee a continuing
supply of materials we do not produce at home-manganese, bauxite,
tin, and other minerals,-coffee and sugar, if you like. (3) The
tanker fleet. This, gentlemen, would be a considerable merchant
marine. It would by no means put us out of the shipping business,
and it would avoid cutting into the economic substance of our friends
in Europe.
Our long-term requirements for merchant type shipping are 
more difficult to estimate. They will of course, be dictated by the 
nature of the war on the military front and by the rate and de­
gree of mobilization of all our other resources. Thus, it is clear we 
will be granted time-within limits-to produce the additional ship­
ping we may need, as our economy and manpower are more widely 
mobilized. No one can say with certainty what our shipping re­
quirements will be in the event of a long war, just as no one can 
say where we shall be compelled to hold and where we may be able 
to go forward, but it is prudent to assume that military operations 
widely separated on the continents of Europe and Asia will have 
to be supported, as will our own civilian economy and the civilian 
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populations of certain of our allies. This bloc of shipping may sur­
pass in tonnage all the Allied shipping of World War II. 
But whatever these requirements may be, it must be em­
phasized that we cannot hope to satisfy them unless we preserve 
the shipbuilding industry in the United States. The know-how of 
building ships is indispensable to sea power. It is at once an art 
and a science, acquired patiently and painstakingly by those who 
practice it. A competent force of designers and technicians upon 
whom the industry may expand must be maintained in peace, if 
the demands of war are to be met. In my opinion, a peacetime 
Merchant Marine of the order I have described-coupled with our 
naval building, the maintenance of the reserve fleets, and certainly 
a program of "prototype-ship" construction-will provide us with 
such a force and serve to keep the shipbuilding industry in a 
healthy condition. 
Gentlemen, I have by no means given you the entire picture 
of the Merchant Marine. The Department of Logistics will under­
take a detailed study of many aspects of this subject I have simply 
touched upon; and Strategy & Tactics students will be afforded a 
resume' of that study later in the year. 
What I have tried to do here today is simply to give you 
an insight into the relation between merchant shipping and national 
power as it has existed in the past, and to provide, if possible, some 
basis of policy for the treatment of other, smaller, maritime powers 
upon whose continued well-being our own best interests depend. 
With much of what I have said, you may not agree. In­
deed, I should expect you to question critically many of the argu­
ments I have put forward. But, as you spend more time here at the 
War College, you will find-as I have-that one of its chief ob­
jectives is to encourage you to think things out for yourself. 
That is also the purpose of these remarks. 
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BASIC ELEMENTS OF NAVAL LOGISTICS 
A lecture delivered by 
Captain H. E. Eccles, U. S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
September 8, 1949 
Napoleon's Russian campaign is the classic example of mili­
tary disaster caused by the failure properly to estimate the logis­
tic situation. Two striking examples of military defeat caused by a 
breakdown or interruption of logistic support are found in the fall 
of the Confederacy and in Rommel's North African campaign. 
In World War II we have recently seen two examples of suc­
cess built on the foundation of a vast trans-oceanic logistic system, 
Eisenhower's European campaign and the war in the Pacific. In 
each case unremitting pressure was made possible by a successful 
logistic support system. Many more examples can be cited to show 
the place of logistics in warfare, but none should be necessary. 
For the last hundred and fifty years there has been a steady 
increase in fire power of all combat units. This, of course, requires 
an increase in the amount of logistic support required to maintain 
one combat soldier or sailor in the war zone. The present acceleration 
of this trend emphasizes the continuing need for a greater logistic 
efficiency and better understanding of the problem. There are two 
ways in which a logistic support system can break down: one, of 
course, is by enemy action, and the other is by its own inefficiency. 
Regardless of the cause of such breakdown, the result is always the 
same; it· is always a marked decrease in combat effectiveness. 
This discussion is not concerned with the strategy and tac .. 
tic� required to cut an enemy's lines of transport and supply. Rather 
it is concerned with a discussion of logistic efficiency. In World War 
Captain Eccles is a member of the Naval War College Staff. 
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II, in spite of much waste and inefficiency, our logistic support sys­
tems worked. This, however, should not lead us to assume that a sim­
ilar method will be satisfactory in a future war. 
The basic situation under which we will fight will probably be 
entirely different: we shall have to fight in an economy of relative 
scarcity as opposed to the economy of plenty in which we fought 
most of World War II. In case of another war the United States 
will have to be prepared to undertake extensive overseas opera­
tions immediately upon the outbreak of war. We will not have the 
time to build up behind the screen of a so called "phoney war" and 
strong allies before we become actively engaged in combat. Also it 
is quite likely that the industrial plant of the continental United 
States will be physically damaged by enemy action. The extent of 
this damage is, of course, impossible to predict but extensive damage 
can easily be caused by long-range air bombardment, guided missiles 
launched from enemy submarines, or sabotage. Finally, the improve­
ments in modern submarines pose an increasing threat to our lines 
of communications to our overseas forces and may have a serious 
effect on our imports of strategic raw materials. Because of. these 
conditions we must search out every means of increasing our 
logistic efficiency. 
As we look at the history of various engineering develop­
ments we find that in each instance major advances in efficiency have 
been based upon an increased knowledge of theory and principle. In 
1903 Wilbur and Orville Wright, while they knew very little about 
the theory and principle of aerodynamics, were able to build an air­
plane that flew. However, the progress from 1903 to 1949 in both 
the internal combustion engine and the airplane itself have both 
been based primarily on an increased knowledge of the theories and 
principles of engineering and aerodynamics. And so it behooves us 
to seek an understanding of logistic theory and principle in order 
that we may improve our logistic efficiency. 
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First comes the question of the definition of Logistics. Just 
what is Logistics? There are many definitions, some of them quite 
long and detailed. For example, there is the definition given by 
Doctor Duncan S., Ballantine in his book, "U. S. Naval Logistics 
in the Second World War'': 
"In its broadest definition the term logistics signifies 
the total process by which the resources of a nation-ma­
terial and human-are mobilized and directed toward the 
accomplishment of military ends. Officially naval logis­
tics has been defined as 'the supply of material and per­
sonnel, including the procurement, storage, distribution 
and transportation of material, and the procurement, 
housing, training, distribution and transportation of per­
sonnel together with the rendering of services to Naval 
operating forces'." 
The JCS definition currently effective is: 
"That part of the entire military activity which deals 
with production, procurement, storage, transportation, 
distribution, maintenance and evacuation of personnel, 
supplies and equipment; with induction, classification, as­
signment, welfare and separation of personnel; and with 
facilities required for the support of the military establish­
ment including construction and operation thereof. It com­
prises both planning and implementation." 
In my opinion neither of these definitions is wholly satis­
factory for our purpose of developing theory and principle, and 
therefore I offer instead a very broad general definition which has 
been derived from Colonel Thorpe's excellent little book "Pure 
Logistics", published in 1917: 
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct 
of military operations; Logistics provides the means there­
for." 
In amplification of this we may consider that the means 
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for the conduct of military operations are MEN, MATERIALS 
and SERVICES. 
Within the framework of this broad definition all the other 
more exact and precise definitions can be included. Furthermore, 
this broad, simple definition has the great advantage of relat­
ing Strategy,Tactics and Logistics. 
In order to understand the importance of this relationship 
let me digress a moment. In the study of war we are interested in 
reality rather than in mere words; and, while words are necessary 
for us to formulate and exchange ideas, yet we must never feel that 
words in themselves have any reality. They are merely symbols and 
regardless of what symbols we use to express our formulation of 
this complex reality that we call war, the words themselves are 
merely the symbols or the means of conveying these ideas. In 
dealing with a reality which is as complex as modern war it is 
understandable that what any particular individual sees will de­
pend very largely on his point of view. That is not a new thing 
because all through human life various people will look at the same 
thing and yet will give a different interpretation of the reality that 
they see in that object. In some instances the differences resulting 
from differences in point of view will be very marked; in other 
cases they may be minor, but differences always exist. F,or ex­
ample, if we consider medicine and anatomy, doctors look at the 
human being in different ways depending on their specialty. If, for 
example, we ask in succession a nerve specialist, an orthopedist, or 
an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist to discuss human nahtre, 
behavior and weakness, we will find that quite likely there will be 
three different points of view expressed. In medicine we have the 
advantage of many years of study in the development of a precise, 
scientific terminology, but even then the discussions of the same 
thing will vary as these three· specialists focus their attention on 
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different aspects of the same reality. We can easily realize that 
their difference fa point of view in no way affects the reality of 
human nature and behavior. 
And so as we look at war we each of us may see it in a 
different perspective. The strategist, the geopolitician, the logis­
tician and the economist will all tend to emphasize different but 
related aspects. In war we do not have a precise and exact scientific 
language with which to express our ideas. In war we are dealing 
with many intangibles, intangibles of the human mind and the 
human spirit, and we are not in a position where we can make 
precise and controlled scientific experiments to further our 
knowledge of war. Therefore, we must expect that our four differ­
ent points of view will produce four very different discussions of war. 
As we study war we find more and more that it is neces­
sary to develop broad and comprehensive understanding. Breadth of 
understanding implies understanding of the other man's point of 
view. The fact that we may have very different points of 
view in our discussions of war does not in any sense imply that 
war itself is different or that the difference in the way two in­
dividuals express their concepts of war indicate that one is wholly 
correct and the other incorrect. 
A useful illustration of how logistics, economics and war are 
related is found in a sentence from a recent Munitions Board 
presentation: 
"The logistic process is at one and the same time the 
military element in the nation's economy and the economic 
element in its military operations." 
The understanding of any complex entity or subject re­
quires a study of its structure. I consider that Logistics has a 
definite structure, that a knowledge of this structure is essential 
to a knowledge of the nature of Logistics and its relationship to 
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war, and I believe that substantial agreement as to . this structure 
will be required before we can go very far in developing sound 
theories and principles of Logistics. So I off er the following formula­
tion of structure for your consideration and criticism. Logistics is 
composed of fundamental elements and basic aspects. I consider 
that the fundamental elements are: The Determination of Require­
ments, Procurement and Distribution; the Basic Aspects are Organi­
tion, Planning, Execution and Supervision. No matter what our task . 
may be in Logistics we will find these elements and aspects, and 
these elements and aspects blend and overlap in a manner which 
varies greatly according to circumstances. Every logistic problem 
starts with the determination of requirements; the next step is 
the procurement of these requirements; the final step is their dis­
tribution. No matter what element we are dealing with we must 
organize, plan, execute and supervise. 
Taking up our basic elements let us first consider require­
ments. The determination of requirements is considered to be part 
of "consumer logistics", and as such is under military control. There 
are many factors in the determination of requirements, but the 
most important in my opinion are six in number. In the first place, 
all logistic requirements to be realistic must stem from specific 
strategical and tactical plans. The questions are: What combat 
forces must we provide for? Where are they going to be operating? 
When are they going to be operating? And in what manner are 
they going to operate? The civilian economy is very important 
because our entire military machine is based on a sound civilian 
economy. If we permit this civilian economy to disintegrate, ulti­
mately this disintegration will spread with disastrous effects upon 
the combat forces. Therefore, in determining our national require­
ments we must be sure to provide for all the human and material 
needs of our civilian economy. This, of course, makes major addi­
tions to the demands upon our overseas shipping for the importation 
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of strategic materials. At the same time we must never forget that 
we have allies who must be supported, and that there are benevolent 
neutrals whose benevolence it pays us to insure by continued sup­
port to their economies. We should never forget that the military 
government of the occupied areas makes further imperative logis­
tic demands and we must provide for them. In World War II we 
did not fully understand the necessity for this ; for instance, in 1943 
during the Italian Campaign the American Army operating in Italy 
was deprived of certain shipments of ammunition because the am­
munition that had been scheduled to sail was cancelled in order to 
provide room for wheat for the civilian population of Italy. In the 
latter part of the war we overcame this deficiency and planned 
for our military government needs, but it was most embarrassing to 
the combat forces to find that ammunition had to yield to civilian 
food. 
In all estimates of requirements we must ascertain the state 
of our resources in pernonnel, material, weapons and facilities, 
and correlate our data to arrive at the final estimates. 
It is only when we have made this complete determination 
of requirements and compared it with the state of our resources 
. 
. 
that we are in a position to determine the manner in which logistic 
considerations may limit our strategical and tactical plans. 
Next in the· field of fundamental elements is the question 
of procurement. This comes under the heading of "producer logis­
tics" and is generally under civilian control. Military procurement 
is based primarily on industrial mobilization, which is the orderly 
coordinated mobilization of all material and human resources of the 
nation for the most effective conduct of war. It requires expansion 
and establishment of production facilities, major conversion of pro­
duction facilities, a very high degree of planning, and the formula-
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tion and issuance of preliminary educational contracts which ex­
tend into actual trial production. Furthermore, industrial mobiliza­
tion must always include consideration of the mobilization and al­
location of manpower to industry. The Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces is a splendid institution which is primarily concerned 
with the study of industrial mobilization. In all matters of pro­
curement we must at all times be fully conscious of the implica­
tions of lead time. Lead time may be defined as "the interval be­
tween the time of the decision to provide an item to the combat 
forces and the time such an item is delivered to these forces in 
adequate quantity and in reliable operating condition for use against 
the enemy." The reliable operating condition means that there is an 
adequate supply of trained personnel both for operation and main­
tenance. This question of lead time enters into almost every logis­
tic problem that can arise in war, and its understanding is a 
matter of the most urgent importance to all officers. Lead time 
may vary from a few hours in the case of certain reserve ma­
terials which are in ready supply in the combat areas, to five or 
ten years for new types of ships or planes or other complex equip­
ment. 
The provision of reliable operating and maintenance per­
sonnel and spare parts is a very important factor in lead time. For 
example, in 1945 the Navy undergoing Kamikaze attacks off Oki­
nawa was very much interested in obtaining airborne early warning 
radar. The Navy Department had developed and tested an airborne 
early warning system and yet the department refused to send it to 
the forward areas. That decision was perfectly correct because 
had this system been sent forward it would have been no real pro­
tection; rather it would have been a delusion or false protection, 
because at that time we did not have the personnel or know how 
to maintain it in reliable operating condition. 
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There is a further but narrower definition of lead time which 
is also important, and in this meaning it indicates the length of time 
necessary to package, ship and deliver to the combat forces ma­
terials which are in ready supply in the zone of the interior. 
We come next to the element of distribution. Distribution 
is part of "consumer logistics" and it is primarily under military 
control. Distribution picks up where procurement leaves off and in 
this pick up there is a very high degree of overlap. Distribution 
normally extends from the depots and warehouses in the con­
tinental United States thoughout the entire combat area up to the 
point where the bullet is placed in the gun or the beans in the mess 
kit of the ultimate consumer. 
Transportation and distribution are almost synonomous. In 
this connection it is always well to remember that transportation 
must be responsive to the needs of the combat command. Again, 
lead time is important. The narrower definition of lead time given 
previously applies primarily to distribution. 
Having discussed very briefly the fundamental elements we 
will now take a look at the basic aspects. First, as to organization­
logistic organizations are large, complex and in many instances 
controversial. It is interesting to note that many of the con­
troversies that existed in the Army in the period in which the gen­
eral staff was developing had their roots in the logistic problems. 
Many of the arguments that are now taking place in Washington 
within and among the three services stem from logistic causes. 
In actual size our logistic organizations are much larger than 
our combat organizations, and therefore no discussion of logistics 
can in any way be complete without consideration of organization. 
Organization is not a dead or static thing. Organization is a living 
thing, and as such it must be constantly re-examined and revised 
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as circumstances dictate. In spite of the tremendous variety of 
good organizations that exist there is usually found in any good 
organization an adherence to sound and well understood principles. 
If we are to depart from these principles (and such departure is 
frequently warranted), we should do it with an awareness that we 
are violating a principle rather than do it out of ignorance. Every 
time you violate a principle of organization you pay a price; some­
times the payment of that price is worthwhile, but not always. 
The commander of any force is always responsible for the 
organization of his force and our commanders should be constant­
ly aware of the urgent necessity for maintaining our peacetime or­
ganizations in such form that there can be a swift transition from 
peace to war without changing the essential structure of the organi­
zation. Peacetime logistics are relatively simple; in war they are 
very complex. If for the sake of immediate economy we allow our 
peacetime organizations to take a form which is unsuited for war, 
when war comes, the commander himself will have to revise that 
organization, and such revision will greatly intrude on the time 
that he would greatly pref er to devote to strategic and tactical 
problems of the most urgent nature. 
When we consider the question of logistic planning we must 
recognize the fundamental principle that strategic and logistical 
planning are inseparable. No logistic plan has any value unless it is 
based on the specific strategic plan, and no strategic plan has any 
value unless it can be logistically supported. 
The always present factor of lead time makes concurrent 
planning mandatory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now so im­
pressed with the necessity for this concurrent strategic and logis­
tical planning that in their forthcoming "Joint Action Armed 
Forces" they propose to say that strategic and logistical planning 
must be concurrent and must precede tactical planning. 
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The :final aspects are execution and supervision. Actually, 
it is hard to make an accurate distinction between these two, and 
therefore they will be considered together. It is well to remember 
that a good plan, well executed, is better than a perfect plan poorly 
executed. Therefore, we should not seek too much perfection in our 
plans, but should sometimes be prepared to say "Let well enough 
alone" and proceed with the execution in spite of known imper­
fections. In this connection let us remember the fact that a 
logistic plan in wartime acquires great actual physical momentum. 
A major operation requires the movement of hundreds of 
thousands of tons of material extending over many months and over 
many thousands of miles of land and sea. While it may be possi­
ble with good and flexible planning to change the direction or 
somewhat modify the timing of an offensive operation, it is very 
difficult to reverse its flow. 
Perfection in planning can never be a substitute for imagina­
tion, initiative, judgment and determination in the execution of 
the plan. 
Continued progress in planning and in the execution of plans 
will depend upon the analysis of results. In other words, logistic 
operations require the same careful analysis and supervision of the 
planned action as do purely combat operations. 
Let us pass from the broad general view of Logistics to 
consideration of Navy Logistics. You are all familiar with the 
present organization of the Navy. It is excellently portrayed in the 
pamphlet "The United States Navy", published by the executive 
office of the Secretary in 1948. If we examine the description and 
discussion therein we :find that through the Civilian Secretaries 
and the Bureau system there is a high degree of civilian control of 
"Producer Logistics". And we :find that through the Chief of Naval 
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Operations, the Frontier, District and Fleet Commanders there is 
military control of "Consumer Logistics". 
All Naval planning stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Chief of Naval Operations and is in three general groups. The 
first stage plans consist of statements of. missions and tasks. The 
second stage plans consist of the Basic Naval Establishment Plan, 
the Basic Mobilization Plans, the Basic Logistic Plan and the 
Strategic and Logistic Code plans. Finally, the third stage plans 
consist of the Supporting and Subsidiary Plans stemming from the 
Code Plans and the amplifying detailed plans prepared by the Com­
manders afloat and ashore who actually execute the plans. 
This excellent planning method which evolved out of the 
experience of World War II provides a flexible, decentralized sys­
tem which is in harmony with sound principles of organization and 
command. 
Thus, we have a sound National Defense Organization and a 
sound Naval Organization and Planning system as a basic structure 
through which Strategy, Logistics and Tactics can be harmoniously 
related. There remains the ever vital task of educating our offi� 
cers to understand and use the system . 
This sound basic support planning system is put into actual 
execution through four related types of Naval operating organiza­
tions. These are: The Continental Shore Establishment, The Ad­
vanced Shore Bases, The Floating Bases and The Mobile Logistic 
Support Forces and Groups. It is through these organizations that 
the Naval Supply System distributes to the fleet the myriad of ma­
terial supplies that are the lifeblood of our seagoing forces. It is 
through these organizations that the services and men are chan­
neled to the fleet. These organizations are linked and fed by trans­
portation systems both sea and air. And again for emphasis let me 
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remind you that transportation must be responsive to the needs of 
combat command. 
A successful offensive requires and acquires momentum. Suc­
cessful war is not a one-two punch, but rather a long succession 
of punches and the closer one punch follows the previous one the 
more the enemy is kept off balance, the less the losses of the at­
tacker and the greater the losses of the defender. This timing is 
vital and is determined primarily by logistic considerations. 
It is obvious that all fighting power ultimately rests upon 
logistic support which is derived from the land. Thus, while we 
recognize that ships are dependent upon the land, we must never 
forget that the fighting ship, more than any other military weapon, 
has within itself inherent mobility and a capacity for self­
sustenance. Hence, many combat operations can be conducted with 
the initial load of supplies that the ships themselves carry. How­
ever, sustained fighting power requires sustained support. This 
sustained support which gives real combat mobility to our Naval 
forces is provided through the coordination of our Shore Establish­
ment, Advanced and Floating Bases and our Mobile Logistic Support 
Forces. 
The use of the Task Force Type of Organization provides us 
with great flexibility; therefore, forces can be constituted, assigned 
missions and provided with adequate attached logistic support 
merely by a simple dispatch. 
We must never forget that the Fifth Fleet was able to fight 
off Okinawa for 90 days supported entirely by the Mobile Logistic 
Support Force, Service Squadron Six, and that it was this support 
that made that sustained fighting power possible. 
Summing up this greatly simplified discussion of basic Na val 
logistics, let me re-state my structural formulation. 
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Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of 
military operations; Logistics provides the means therefor. 
The means of war are Men, Materials and Services. The 
Fundamental Elements of Logistics are the Determination of Re­
quirements, Procurement and Distribution. 
The Basic Aspects are Organization, Planning, Execution 
and Supervision. In all cases these elements and aspects blend and 
overlap in a manner and degree which varies according to circum­
stances. When properly integrated with strategic and tactical con­
siderations they combine to form a sound and harmonious structure 
of flexible, mobile, and sustained fighting power. 
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WHAT GOES ON HERE 
An article by 
Payson S. Wild, Jr. 
Americans, like most human beings, recoil at the thought of 
war, and the idea of another war, a World War III, seems repulsive 
beyond description. However, here and there in our country, there 
are voices which are saying that we should engage in a so-called 
"preventive war" against Russia. Some of these voices are scarcely 
raised above a whisper, but the mere fact that a conflict against the 
Soviets is being urged at all is of considerable significance. Be­
cause this subject is so highly explosive, it might be argued that 
it should be kept under cover, but in a democracy such as ours, ex­
perience indicates that it is healthier to bring a discussion out into 
the open where it can be appraised on its merits rather than to 
treat it as something "hush-hush." Therefore, let's face up to the 
issues involved, however unpalatable they may be, and let's bring 
the problem out into the daylight where a more careful examina­
tion is possible. 
Why Some People Favor a "Preventive War" 
The premise of those who favor our making war against the 
Soviet Union in the near future is a very simple one, namely, that 
war between the United States and Russia is inevitable anyway, so 
why shouldn't we fight when the odds seem favorable to us? Pro­
ponents of a "preventive war" on our part maintain that the Com­
munists, and this includes the Soviet leaders, believe that a war to 
· the finish between communism and capitalism must come some­
time and that according to the philosophy of communism, the in-
Professor Wild is Professor of Government and Dean of the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. This arti­
cle is a reprint of Prof. Wild's article as it appeared in the June 1949 
issue of Woman's Day. Prof. Wild served for many years as Associate 
for International Law at the Naval War College. 
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terests of a Communist state and those of a non-Communist power 
are irreconcilable. Therefore, since peaceful coexistence between 
Russia and the United States is impossible from the point of view 
of the Kremlin itself, it behooves us, says the "preventive war" 
school, to prepare now for the showdown and to attack when it suits 
us and not the Communists. 
Those who would have us launch the war first thus cite the 
Communist texts on the inevitability of war between the rival ide­
ologies and also the statements of Russian officials to the effect that 
capitalism is an enemy which must be vanquished by force. The 
violent anti-American tone of the Russian press and radio, the war­
like speeches of the high Soviet command and the constant stream 
of denunciations of the West pouring from behind the Iron Curtain 
all indicate, it is alleged, that the Soviet Union is convinced that the 
"cold war" must get really "hot" in the future. Analyzing Soviet 
psychology and reasoning, "preventive war" supporters declare that 
the basic strategy of communism never changes and that this 
strategy is based on the assumption that capitalist nations and the 
capitalist class must in time be liquidated by violence and war. That, 
it is maintained, is the ultimate goal of Russian Communist thinking. 
Furthermore, say such supporters, we should not be deceived 
by day-to-day changes or modifications in Communist tactics. When 
it seems advisable or convenient, the Russian government may talk 
peace or make concessions and Stalin may utter soothing words or 
agree to treaties which contain appealing phrases but all this, it is 
asserted, is just a matter of expediency and temporary a�justment 
which does not alter the hard core of Communist strategy built on 
the doctrine of an ultimate war to the finish. 
The Russians, therefore, will not hesitate to attack us, say 
the "preventive war" people, when they feel that they are ready. 
And when will they be ready? Here's where the atomic bomb comes 
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into the argument. Back in 1945, just after Hiroshima, the scient­
ists estimated that it would take the Russians from three to five 
years to produce an atomic bomb of their own. Nearly four years 
have passed since then and time is growing short, if the estimates 
are correct. Nowadays, some atomic experts say it may be 1952 or 
1953 before the Russians can produce the bomb with any degree 
of success, but what will happen when the American monopoly comes 
to an end? At that point, say those favoring a "preventive war," 
our present advantage stemming from our sole possession of the 
bomb will be gone and we shall be at the mercy of the ruthless dis­
ciples of Marx and his class-war school who will not hesitate to 
obliterate our cities when they deem themselves ready. 
Therefore, it is argued, why should we not attack fairly soon 
before the Russians get the bomb and prevent them from waging 
war on us at a later time? That's why there is talk of a "pre­
ventive war," a war to forestall a later Soviet onslaught which, it is 
declared, is bound to come at some point. This argument is but­
tressed by references to the Russian stand on the international con­
trol of atomic energy in the United Nations. If, it is asked, the Soviet 
Union genuinely desired peace, why didn't she subscribe to the plan 
for placing all fissionable material under the direction of an inter­
national agency, as proposed by the United States and all the non­
Communist members of the United Nations, thus removing atomic 
energy from the authority of any national government? Soviet op­
position to international control and Soviet insistence on freedom 
to manage atomic energy plants on her own, proves, it is claimed, 
that Russia wants to stock-pile bombs for her own purposes, which 
include a war against us when she thinks the time is ripe. 
Believers in a "preventive war" go on to describe what they 
think the situation will be like once the Russians acquire the bomb. 
They predict that it will be a time of almost unbearable tension. 
We shall be living in a war atmosphere, they say, with the threat of 
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terrible destruction hanging over us. Because there seems to be 
no adequate defense against an atomic bomb attack, the advantage 
lies with the attacker who will endeavor to destroy or paralyze his 
foe before the latter has a chance to retaliate or rally for a come­
back. Unlik� 1917 or 1941, . we shall not have time, it is said, to 
mobilize in a relatively leisurely fashion. To forestall the dreadful 
consequences of being attacked in an atomic war, each side will be 
under an almost overwhelming temptation to make a surprise at.; 
tack first, it is declared, and with the Russians in possession of the 
bomb, we shall be at the mercy of the Rusisan Communists unless 
we destroy them first. 
The logic of the "preventive war" school is thus clear: the 
Communists will make war on us sometime, believing as they do 
that such a war is inevitable, and are holding off until they acquire 
the atomic bomb and find the moment auspicious for their purposes; 
If that is the case, then why shouldn't we move up the time for the 
war while we alone have the bomb and in the name of our own self.,. 
defense strike while we have superiority instead of remaining pass­
ive while they prepare to hit us at their convenience? 
It is argued, however, that the United States, as a dem­
ocracy with a Constitution which requires a vote in Congress be­
fore we can legally make war, is not the kind of nation which can 
wage a "preventive war," that is, a war in which we suddenly at­
tack on our own initiative. To this the "preventive war'' people re­
ply that (1) the President and the military establishment should 
go ahead anyway and take quick military action without a delayed 
build-up in public opinion and in Congress, explaining the reasons 
later, and (2) the Russians are taking advantage of our good nature 
and our democratic ways. They know, it is claimed, that despite 
their belief in an inevitable armed clash, we are not the sort of 
country which will unleash an unprovoked attack. Our very virtues 
are our undoing, it is asserted; therefore, in dealing with a dictator-
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ship which can operate with speed and which can go to war without 
consulting the people of Russia, we should, it is urged, be prepared 
to move swiftly ourselves and thus surprise the Soviet rulers who 
are counting on our hatred of war and our reluctance to attack 
first as a means for allowing them to "blitz" us at a time of their 
choosing. 
What Opponents of a "Preventive War" Say 
The arguments against the "preventive war" philosophy fall 
into at least three main categories. One stresses the difficulties of a 
"preventive war" purely from the military point of view, a second 
challenges the assumption that war is inevitable and a third main­
tains that military force by itself cannot eradicate the menace of 
communism. Involved in the second and third arguments is really 
a fourth, namely, the point of view of morality which questions 
the right to bring on deliberately the horrors, death and destruction 
of war on the grounds of a hypothesis, the hypothesis or assumption 
that war is inevitable when that hypothesis cannot really be proved. 
Taking up the military problem first, critics of the ''pre­
ventive war" idea assert that its advocates seem to assume that 
defeating Soviet Russia would involve merely tossing some atomic 
bombs on Russian cities and that after that,the Soviet Union would 
cry quits and sue for peace. The attitude that victory over Russia 
could be gained in this fairly easy and relatively effortless fashion 
is seriously questioned, however, by many experts, both military and 
civilian, who have studied the problem. In the first place, these ex­
perts say that Russia is so vast and the dispersion of industry and 
resources is on such an enormous scale that atomic bombing of cer­
tain cities would be insufficient for a knockout blow. Furthermore, 
it is claimed, at the first sign of attack the Russian army would 
sweep over Western Europe and ensconce itself in virtually every 
corner of that continent. Would we then drop atomic bombs on Paris, 
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Brussels, Rome and other cities inhabited by peoples friendly to us 
in order to disrupt Russian military establishments? That would 
be a tough question to decide. 
Above all, say the experts, the war could not be won by 
bombs alone. In the last analysis, it is troops which would have 
to support air attack and carry the day by actually defeating the 
armed forces of the enemy. Therefore, so goes the argument, 
we should have to be prepared to transport armies overseas, land 
them in Europe, and smash the Soviet military machine in direct 
combat. In other words, if the Soviets occupied Europe, we would 
have to have another "D-Day" all over again and would have to 
challenge a powerful foe well entrenched behind the Atlantic sea 
wall. Even if resistance in the West prevented the Russians from 
smashing immediately to the ocean, huge American reinforcements 
would have to be ready for fighting in Europe. The experiences of 
both Napoleon and Hitler in trying to conquer Russia are cited as 
evidence of the extreme difficulty which might be encountered if 
an attempt were made to invade Russia itself, a land which 
stretches thousands of miles from Poland across Siberia to the 
Pacific. 
Then, say the "preventive war" opponents, suppose Russia 
is vanquished, suppose that even air attacks brought about Soviet 
peace overtures, we would still have to send a huge army of occupa­
tion to insure Russian compliance with our peace terms. Equipping 
and maintaining the large armies needed both for war and for or­
cupation would, it is claimed, strain the American economy to the 
utmost. Our way of life would be transformed; we would have to 
become, state some experts, a military nation, with our manpower 
and industry geared to the needs of a titanic military establishment. 
Our relaxed, democratic ways, our production of civilian goods, our 
peacetime pursuits would all disappear under the harsh necessity 
40 
44
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/1
RESTRICTED 
of supporting naval, ground and air forces capable of subduing a 
powerful enemy and of holding him down afterward. 
A "preventive war," therefore, is not something to be en­
tered upon lightly. Those who have misgivings about such an en­
terprise emphasize the tremendous problems involved and stress 
what such a war would do to our democracy. They declare that a war 
against Russia could not possibly be worth the carnage, devasta­
tion and ruinous economic burdens entailed and suggest that it 
would be such a disaster in so many ways that it should be thought 
of only as a last resort when absolutely no other alternative giving 
us a chance for survival seemed at hand. 
Is War Inevitable? 
Next, fault is found with the assumption that war with the 
Soviet Union is inevitable. Those not in sympathy with the 
"preventive war" point of view sometimes concede that war is pos­
sible and that Communist ideology stresses the inevitability of a 
showdown fight between communism and rival ideologies. They 
may admit also that Russian behavior since 1945 has appeared to 
be belligerent and non-cooperative. However, the opposition be­
lieves that there is a chance, and not a slender one at that, that the 
Soviet system can be halted without a war. It is pointed out that 
the Kremlin leaders have pushed ahead whenever the going looked 
easy, as in Eastern Europe, but that they have hesitated and acted 
cautiously when confronted by formidable power. This line of 
reasoning maintains that the Communist bosses are realists and, 
unlike Hitler, are rational; that is, they will not go adventuring if 
the odds look so great against them that they might lose. There­
fore, it is contended that if the United States and like-minded na­
tions build up a power coalition which out-balances the U. S. S. R., 
the Russians will be deterred from attacking, should they be so 
minded, and will refrain from pressing matters to the breaking 
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point. Furthermore, there are some who believe that the U. S. S. R. 
has no aggressive designs whatsoever and that Russian moves 
since 1945 have been primarily defensive anyway. 
The concept of a power alignment offsetting Russian power 
as a means of inducing the Soviets to refrain from warlike actions, 
if they have any such intentions, underlies the whole American 
policy of "containment" as expressed in the Truman doctrine, aid to 
Greece and Turkey and the Atlantic Pact. The hope is that the prns­
pect of being confronted by superior force will remove any tempta­
tion on the part of the Communists to engage in an all-out war. Re-· 
inforcing this view is the claim that the Communists themselves 
are in no hurry, believing as they do that time is on their side and 
that no exact timetable of conquest on Hitler's model is necessary, 
and that if we can hold firm indefinitely, they can be contained in­
definitely. Thus, in time, they will come to accept the fact, it is said, 
that they must adjust to a situation in which a larger measure of 
cooperation is the only alternative to a hopeless war. Isn't it 
better, ask the "preventive war" critics, to proceed on these lines 
and to take the chance of averting war in this fashion, than to pro­
voke hostilities deliberately and bathe the world in blood on the 
basis of an uproved assumption that such a holocaust must come 
anyway? 
What happens when the Russians get the bomb? Here 
again the opponents of a "preventive war" admit that there will be 
severe tension and considerable danger. But, it is said, we have 
such a head start and will have so many more bombs available than 
they at any given point, that they will not be assured of any easy 
success should they decide to unleash a surprise attack. Provided 
we disperse our atomic resources so that we could survive an initial 
blow with considerable stores of bombs left for a counterattack, 
the Russians would have to reckon with a retaliatory onslaught, the 
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thought of which, it is asserted, ought to operate as a fairly ef­
fective deterrent. Thus, if we build up power on our side, and pre­
pare sensibly for a possible surprise blow against us, we should, it 
is argued, be able to convince the Russians that war would be too 
dangerous for them. In time, then, they would have to settle down 
and recognize that the goal of world communism was impossible of 
achievement without risks which would appear overwhelming. 
Above all, say those opposed to a "preventive war," by avoiding 
hysteria and provocative measur�s which could goad Russia into 
belligerent countermoves and by keeping the diplomatic situation 
fluid, with room for negotiation, we can, with careful leadership, 
a1-rive at a stable relationship. 
A "Preventive War" and Communism 
A third major argument against a "preventive war" is that 
even if it were successful in destroying Russian military power, it 
would not eliminate communism. In fact, some declare, such an at­
tack by us would stimulate its growth. The contention is that com­
munism is an idea which appeals to people who are in distress and 
who are dissatisfied with existing conditions, and which thrives on 
disorder and chaos. Therefore, the claim is, unless we help to im­
prove the lot of millions throughout the globe who see in communism 
a chance to alter a state of affairs which they consider unsatisfac­
tory, we shall not win them as converts to our cause. 
Difficult as it is for us to realize, communism as an idea, it 
is pointed out, has an appeal for the impoverished and the dis­
possesssed who long to improve their status. The reality of com­
munism in Russia and in the satellite states is one thing but to 
people in Asia, Africa and the Near East who hear only the Com­
munist promises of education, of more material goods, of medical 
care and of "freedom" for the masses, the dream of communism 
has a drawing power which, it is maintained, can be counteracted 
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best by our showing that our way offers at least as much and a lot 
more. Those who do not countenance the thought of a "preventiv� 
war" insist, therefore, that a military conquest of Russia would not 
eradicate the roots of communism which flourish in discontent and 
misery. We would still, after victory, have to take care of the popula­
tions who have proved susceptible to communist propaganda. And a 
war, it is stated, would increase the unrest and reduce the standards 
of living making more friends for communism than ever. 
We and the Communists are struggling to capture men's 
minds. Military means alone, say the foes of a "preventive war," do 
not win out in this psychological struggle: you can't spread dem­
ocracy by bayonets and machine guns. If we attacked Russia first, 
wouldn't we, it is asked, play right into the hands of the Com­
munists who would say, "See, we told you those capitalists were 
warmongers who don't care about human welfare and who don't 
shrink at wholesale slaughter"? How would we look to the rest 
of the world? 
Alternatives to War 
Ideas and ideals have tremendous power in themselves, and 
military force by itself is sterile, as Hitler's efforts to win con­
quered populations by repression alone has shown. Hence, say 
those condemning a "preventive war," it is up to us to prove that 
democracy is better and has more to offer materially and morally 
than communism, and we can't do that solely by a display of armed 
might. Creating a defensive military alignment to hem in Soviet 
expansionism may be a necessary step but, it is alleged, this is 
largely a negative measure which mu�t be coupled with a positive 
policy of outbidding the Communists in terms of benefits and ideo­
logical appeal. Communist ideology will be beaten, therefore, not 
by force but by a better ideological and material offensive on our 
part, it is claimed. 
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At this point, "preventive war" opponents call attention to 
the fact that we Americans are really revolutionaries in the modern 
world. Peoples everywhere have been stirred by our accomplish­
ments. They want what we have to offer and can produce. Amer­
ican movies and the gadgets such as cigarette lighters, wrist 
watches, fountain pens and knives carried by our GI's to all corners 
of the earth have, for example, created a demand for such items by 
populations everywhere. These peoples are not content with their 
present material standards and are demanding and pressing for a 
share of the wonders which the United States has on display. The 
United States has created a global ferment and the Communists in 
many instances have capitalized on this unrest by promising to fill 
such wants . But Soviet production is now unequal to the task. An 
imaginative America, it is declared, can take the initiative from 
communism by sharing our "know how" and turning our technical 
skill in the direction of assisting others to participate more fully in 
the benefits to be derived from our type of enterprise under demo­
cratic auspices. 
Instead of waging war to beat communism, it is argued that 
we can come out on top, through skillful diplomacy and by adding a 
program of economic and social welfare to our defensive military 
arrangements. In this fashion, say the exponents of this position, 
we may avoid the horrors of war, and assume an unassailable type 
· of leadership in world affairs which will win us firm friends and
pull the props out from Communist arguments. To· attack Russia
first would mean, according to this thesis, that we would sacrifice
our moral hold on men's minds and would enable the Communists
to call us selfish imperialists bent on global supremacy for the sake
of profits and power. In line with this argument, Mr. David E.
Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said re­
cently, "There are those among us who have been bewitched by
the atomic bomb ........ But it is important for us to recognize that 
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neither the atomic bomb nor any form of power ........ constitutes the 
true source of American strength ........ That source is our ethical and 
moral standards of precepts and our democratic faith in man. This 
faith is the chief armament of our democracy. It is the most 
potent weapon ever devised." 
46 
50
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 9, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss9/1
